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Searches by Drug Detection Dogs in
Pennsylvania Public Schools: A
Constitutional Analysis
I. Introduction
Drug usage among high school students poses a problem of sig-
nificant proportions. A recent national. survey found that nearly
sixty-two percent of American high school seniors have used mari-
juana at least once' and evidence suggests that this figure will not
decline in the foreseeable future.
2
This situation has led certain school districts in Pennsylvania to
develop affirmative methods that are designed to combat the alarm-
ing rate of drug usage among students.3 One current program is de-
scribed in the following hypothetical situation.
After the dismissal of students from the public high school, the
principal, a police officer, and a drug detection dog with handler be-
1. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DRUG ABUSE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, DRUG ABUSE AMONG AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS 1975-1977 2 (1977).
This study also indicates that almost ten percent of high school seniors use marijuana daily.
Id at 3.
Looking at a broader range of students, one study reports that nearly one-third of twelve
to seventeen year olds and well over one-half of eighteen to twenty-five year olds have ac-
knowledged some illicit drug experience. YOUTH DRUG ABUSE 18 (G. Beschner & A. Fried-
man, eds. 1979).
The statistics above are representative of current levels of drug use in Pennsylvania. Of
those people undergoing treatment in state drug treatment facilities from July 1, 1975 to De-
cember 31, 1976, sixty-two percent were juveniles under eighteen years old and thirty-eight
percent were young adults of eighteen to nineteen years of age. Id at 633.
2. YOUTH DRUG ABUSE 22, 23 (G. Beschner & A. Friedman, eds. 1979).
The federal government has recognized the climbing trend in marijuana usage and has
called this a "matter of major public concern." OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY, 1978 AN-
NUAL REPORT 28.
Congress has also identified the use of polydrugs among youth as a "serious threat." Al-
cohol and Drug Abuse Education Amendments of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-336, 79 Stat. 451
("polydrug" refers to the use of more than one drug at a time). See also Veteran's Health Care
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-22, 93 Stat. 47 (polydrug use among drug patients is
increasing). But see International Security Assistance Acts of 1979, Pub. L.. No. 96-92, 93 Stat.
701 (international pressure on heroin traffic has reduced the number of addicts in the United
States by 50,000).
3. The Northern York School District was the first school district in Pennsylvania to
implement a drug prevention program using a trained detection dog. Interview with Niles
Benn, Esq., Solicitor, Northern York School District, in Dillsburg, Pennsylvania (Feb. 5,
1980).
gin a survey of the school's hallways. The purpose of the operation
is to detect the presence of illegal drugs in the students' lockers. At
one particular locker the dog alerts, thus indicating the possible pres-
ence of contraband. The principal then obtains a master key, un-
locks the locker and discovers a bag of marijuana. Based upon this
evidence the student assigned to the locker is suspended from school.
Despite the Commonwealth's early recognition of the serious-
ness of the drug problem4 and the existence of programs similar to
the one described above, only a small number of court opinions deal
with the constitutionality of school searches5 and no Pennsylvania
case has examined the legality of the use of drug dogs in any context.
Other states and the federal courts have ruled on the use of dogs in a
variety of situations,6 but Doe v. Renfrow7 is the only case that has
examined the employment of a dog in the search of a public high
school.
In Doe a federal district court held that the sniffing by a drug
detection dog of students who were seated in their classrooms did
not violate the provisions of the fourth amendment.' A key factor in
the court's reasoning was that no criminal prosecutions resulted from
the discovery of marijuana.9 Suspensions and expulsions of viola-
tors, however, did follow.'0
The fourth amendment" protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. Its applicability to drug
searches in public schools, therefore, depends upon the existence of
three facts: (1) the action was the product of the government or an
agent of the government; (2) the action invaded an area that is con-
stitutionally protected; and (3) the action constituted a search.
This comment will analyze each of these issues as it relates to a
dog's random search of students' lockers. It will conclude with a
discussion of the consequences that result from the application of the
fourth amendment with particular emphasis on the warrant require-
ment.
4. See THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON DRUGS, DRUG ABUSE IN PENNSYLVANIA 5
(1970).
5. See note 12 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 49, 51 and accompanying text infra.
7. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
8. Id at 1025-26.
9. Id at 1016.
10. Id at 1017. The dogs alerted approximately fifty times throughout the course of the
search. Of the seventeen students found in possession of contraband, twelve voluntarily with-
drew from school, two were suspended, and three were expelled.
11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
II. Governmental Action
The precise issue addressed here is whether the action of the
school official, policeman, dog and handler constituted governmen-
tal action. The analysis begins with an examination of the role of the
school official.
A. The School Official Acting Alone
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that a high school
principal conducting a search of a student acts as a privite citizen. 2
Consequently, the provisions of the fourth amendment do not apply
to the conduct of the search. 3 The primary basis for this holding
stems from the concept that a teacher has an affirmative duty to
maintain discipline, and thus stands in loco parentis. '"
Although some other jurisdictions have adopted this position,'5
criticism of the holding and rationale is widespread. 6 A number of
states and commentators find that reliance on the doctrine of in loco
parentis is misplaced.' 7 Instead, they prefer to make an objective
analysis of the relationship between the school official and the state.
Frequently courts find that school districts are government agencies
that hire teachers who are accountable to the local school board.
Therefore, when a teacher conducts a search pursuant to authority
bestowed upon him by virtue of his position, he acts as an agent of
the state.'
8
12. Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974).
13. Id at 381, 323 A.2d at 147. The inapplicability of the fourth amendment to searches
by private citizens has long been an accepted interpretation of the Constitution. Burdeau v.
McDoweil, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921).
14. Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. at 381, 323 A.2d at 147. The court
relied primarily on the case of In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1969), which stressed the necessity for an orderly academic environment, and People v. Jack-
son, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971), which invoked the doctrine of in locoparentis.
The Pennsylvania legislature has explicitly granted parental authority to school officials in
the conduct of their duties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1317 (Purdon 1962).
15. See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (1969);
Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
16. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, e.g., Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. REV. 739 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Buss]. The author maintains that reliance on in
locoparentir is inappropriate in the school search context because of "the absence of a genu-
inely parental protective concern for the student who is threatened with the school's power."
Id at 768. See also Note, School Official's Authority to Search Students is Augmented by the In
Loco Parentis Doctrine, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 526, 531 (1977).
For the common-law position on in locoparentis, see I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARJES
453 (parent may delegate part of his parental authority to the teacher). Accord, Guerrieri v.
Tyson, 147 Pa. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).
For a broad historical analysis of in loco parentis, see Mawdsley, In Loco Parenti: A
Balancing of Interests, 61 ILL.B.J. 638 (1973).
18. Cases that have held that a school official is a state agent include: Bellnier v. Lund,
438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); People
v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d
102 (1972); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483,
The superior court's concern with the teacher's duty and the
doctrine of in locoparentis in Commonwealth v. Ding/elt19 allowed it
to avoid dealing with evidence that forcefully established the requi-
site degree of state involvement. Public school districts in Penn-
sylvania are agencies of the state2" and are, therefore, subject to the
provisions of the Local Agency Law.2' Furthermore, school districts
are statutorily authorized to hire professional personnel to staff
schools.22 Consequently, a direct link exists between the teachers
and the government. A recognition of this nexus leads to the conclu-
sion that a public high school teacher is indeed an agent of the gov-
ernment.
B. The School Official Acting with Police
The involvement of the police, either as a dog handler or pas-
sive participant in the operation, further characterizes the event as a
governmental action. Any attempt by school authorities to disguise
the official nature of the involvement by labelling the policeman a
school security officer2 3 or by asserting that he is "off duty"24 is not
likely to survive judicial scrutiny. Instead, courts will find state ac-
tion if the police requested the search, participated in it, or exercised
control over the object while it was being searched.2" Using this test,
even the passive involvement of a police officer is likely to invoke the
315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); People v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P.2d 113
(1974).
For the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, the United States Supreme Court held that
boards of education are agents of the state. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
19. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974).
20. "Public school districts are creatures or agencies of the Legislature; they have no
inherent powers of government; and the only powers, functions, and duties they possess are
those expressly or by necessary implication authorized by statute." Abington School District
v. Yost, 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 312, 319, 397 A.2d 453, 457 (1979).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11301 (Purdon 1972). A school district may exercise quasi-
judicial functions pursuant to authority granted by the state legislature. School Board of the
School District of Penn Hills v. McDonald, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 339, 298 A.2d 612 (1972).
As far as the quasi-legislative function is concerned, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently held that the State Board of Education has the authority to promulgate regulations
governing student conduct and discipline. Girard School District v. Pittenger, 481 Pa. 91, 392
A.2d 261 (1978). The court, however, did not decide the constitutionality of any particular
regulation. Id at 265.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1106 (Purdon 1962).
23. In People v. Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1974), the court noted the
distinction between a teacher and a school security officer and held that a search by a security
officer must fully comply with all provisions of the fourth amendment.
24. In Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 393 A.2d 838 (1978), the court found that
the technical status of the policeman is irrelevant. Consequently, a search by an off-duty auxil-
iary policeman constituted state action. Id at 97-9, 383 A.2d at 840-41.
25. Commonwealth v. Adams, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 475, 484, 341 A.2d 206, 211 (1975).
Accord, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S, 74, 79 (1949) (plurality opinion) ("so long as he [the
police officer] was in it before the object of the search was completely accomplished, he must
be deemed to have participated in it.") See also Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.
1971); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975) (a school
search initiated by police must be based on probable cause).
application of the fourth amendment. If the handler is a policeman
or if the dog is owned by the local government,26 a finding of state
action is inescapable.27
C. Summary
From a standpoint of governmental involvement, an accurate
description of the hypothetical operation is as follows. Pursuant to
the directions of a state agency (the school district), a state employee
(the principal) initiated an action to enforce lawful regulations. A
local police officer assisted in the conduct of the operation. An asser-
tion that this action is anything but a state action reflects an avoid-
ance of the facts and serves only to cripple the applicability of the
fourth amendment.
III. The Student's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the
School Locker
The second inquiry in determining whether the fourth amend-
ment is applicable looks to whether the object or place being
searched is worthy of constitutional protection. In Katz v. United
States28 the Supreme Court established a two prong test for making
this determination. To invoke the protection of the fourth amend-
ment, the complaining party must first have a subjective expectation
of privacy in the area invaded and, second, the expectation must be
reasonable.29  In another decision, Mancusi v. DeForte,3 ° the
Supreme Court removed the requirement that the complainant have
a property right in the object of the search. For the most part, Penn-
sylvania courts use the same two-part analysis.3"
The application of this test to the search of a student's locker
has resulted in courts from several jurisdictions holding that students
do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their school
locker.32 The possession of a master key by school officials serves as
26. The drug dog routinely used by the Northern York School District is owned by the
local government and handled by the Chief of Police. Telephone interview with A. William
Castle, III, Chief of Police, Carroll-Franklin Township Police Department (Feb. 12, 1980).
27. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp.
1012, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (the presence of the police did not change the private nature of the
school official's activity); In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 325, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685
(1972) (a police officer who searched a student was declared an agent of the vice-principal).
For criticism of the decision in In re Fred C., see Phay & Rogister, Searches of Students and the
Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L. & ED. 57, 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Searches ofStudents]; Note,
Public School Searches and Seizures, 45 FoaD L. REV. 202, 213 (1976).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Id at 351-52.
30. 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
31. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shaw, 476 Pa. 543, 551, 383 A.2d 496, 499 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Flewellen, 475 Pa. 442, 380 A.2d 1217 (1977).
32. State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970);
the primary basis for this reasoning.33 The rationale is that even if a
student subjectively considered his locker to be private, his knowl-
edge of the existence of a master key makes this expectation unrea-
sonable. A second important consideration is that the locker is
school property.34 The Supreme Court's analysis in Mancusi v.
DeForts,35 downplaying the importance of property rights,36 has se-
riously weakened this justification for a finding of no expectation of
privacy. Nevertheless, the integration of these two considerations
leads some courts to find that a student's possession of his locker is
exclusive only with respect to fellow students and not school offi-
cials.3 7
In addition to the analysis outlined above, courts have found
support for this conclusion by examining analogous cases involving
searches of lockers in public buildings.38
The absence of a definitive ruling by either the United States
Supreme Court or a Pennsylvania appellate court, combined with
persuasive arguments to the contrary, creates uncertainty about the
validity of the majority view that a school locker search does not
ordinarily contravene fourth amendment protections. Pennsylvania
courts have sought to apply the fourth amendment in a more expan-
sive manner than the federal courts. 9 For example, the state
supreme court has found that access to personal effects by others
does not deprive the owner of constitutional protection.' This state-
People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969); A.B.C., Alleged
Delinquent, 20 Cumb. L.J. 60, 50 D. & C.2d 115 (1970).
33. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 524, 249 N.E.2d 366, 367, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480
(1969); A.B.C. Alleged Delinquent, 20 Cumb. L.J. 60, 62, 50 D. & C.2d 115, 118 (1970).
34. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 524-26, 249 N.E.2d 366, 367-68, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479,
480-82 (1969).
35. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
36. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
37. State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 640, 456 P.2d 1, 3 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947
(1970). See also Searches ofStudents, supra note 27, at 66; Note, Constitutional Rights ofHigh
School Students, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 403 (1974).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217, 1219-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 989 (1975) (postal employee's acceptance of the locker constituted consent to searches
authorized by regulations); Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997, 1002-03 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (a
deputy sherifi's locker was the property of the government and therefore, subject to search);
United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921, 923-24 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (locker at U.S. mint was
subject to regular inspection, so no reasonable expectation of privacy existed.
39. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 43, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (1979). See also
Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 219 n.2, 239 A.2d 290, 292 n.2 (1968) (state has the
power to impose higher standards for searches and seizures than those imposed by federal
courts).
40. In Commonwealth v. White, 459 Pa. 84, 327 A.2d 40 (1974), the court stated,
An individual's effects and possessions are constitutionally protected from unreason-
able searches and seizures as well as his person. This fact does not depend on the
physical presence or physical absence of the individual owner. So long as a person
seeks to preserve his effects as private, even if they are accessible to... others, they are
constitutionally protected (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id at 89-90. 327 A.2d at 42.
See also Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (delin-
quent residents of a youth center retain some fourth amendment protection).
ment, read in conjunction with an earlier decision by the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court, which determined that a room in a college
dormitory was constitutionally protected,4 would permit the conclu-
sion that a student's high school locker is also protected.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
cently held that a policeman possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his locker at the police station. 2 Not only did the court
find that ownership of the locker was immaterial43 but "the fact that
the police officers. . . knew that most of the lockers could be opened
with a master key does not make an expectation of privacy unrea-
sonable."'  Similar logic by a California court resulted in a determi-
nation that a restaurant employee retained a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an unlocked locker provided for his use by the em-
ployer. 5
Constitutional protection is not triggered by the appearance of
any one particular fact. Rather, in evaluating the reasonableness of
the expectation, the courts must also be concerned with the character
and function of the searching agent. This additional element allows
the protection of the fourth amendment to extend to student lockers
when a policeman and his drug detection dog conduct a search. The
declaration by courts that a student's possession of his locker is not
exclusive with respect to school officials' is inadequate to justify a
search by the policeman with a dog.
Clearly, a contrary ruling eliminates the need to evaluate the
reasonablensss 47 of the search. This ruling, however, will only re-
solve cases if the school official discovers the contraband in plain
view upon opening the locker. The question of reasonableness
would again surface if the school official discovered the contraband
after opening a gym bag or similar personal article located inside the
41. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970) (entrance
by college officials into a student's room without a warrant was unconstitutional). See gener-
ally Note, The Legality of University-Conducted Dormitory Searchesfor Internal Disciplinary
Purposes, 1976 DUKE L.J. 770.
42. United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362, 363 (3d Cir. 1977).
43. Id at 364.
44. Id
45. Tucker v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 84 Cal. App. 3d 43, 48, 148 Cal. Rptr.
167, 169 (1978). In this case the policeman did not personally intrude into the protected area.
He had arrested the defendant outside the restaurant and, because of the cold weather, asked a
waitress to retrieve the defendant's jacket. When she reached inside the unlocked locker she
did so as an agent of the policeman. Id at 46, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
See also Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 826-28 (3d Cir. 1978) (school guidance coun-
selor maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unlocked, school-owned desk);
Buss, supra note 17, at 746 ("clearly" a public school locker is protected by the fourth amend-
ment).
Cf. Searches ofstudents, supra note 27, at 67 (a school official is more analogous to a
landlord than to a parent in the context of a search). Landlords cannot consent to a search of a
tenant's property. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
46. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
locker. There can be little doubt that the student possesses a reason-
able expectation of privacy in a private container secured within a
locked locker.48
IV. The Conduct of the Dog
The final element that must exist before the provisions of the
fourth amendment attach is that the action complained of was in fact
a search. Therefore, the exact conduct of the dog must be consid-
ered.
A. The Use of the Dog Does Not Constitute A Search
In Doe v. Renfrow, 9 the court sided with the majority of juris-
dictions when it held that the mere sniffing of the dog does not con-
stitute a search.50 The primary basis for this holding is that no
physical intrusion actually took place.5 Also important to the ma-
jority view is that the use of a dog is distinguishable from the use of a
sophisticated electronic device.52 The distinction frequently drawn is
that the dog has been trained to detect only contraband, while de-
vices such as metal detectors are indiscriminate in their search.5 3
Obviously this distinction is only valid when the dog's performance
record reveals no false alerts. The majority of courts consequently
hold that the dog is merely a sense-enhancing device, the use of
which is generally inoffensive.54
48. This conclusion relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), which held that a footlocker, lawfully in the possession of the
police, is still constitutionally protected and can only be searched if a warrant has been issued.
Id at II. Therefore, even if the school official lawfully seized the student's personal property,
the student would still retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in that object.
49. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
50. Id at 1019.
51. United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Solis,
536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 424 U.S. 918 (1976); United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(per curiam).
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928), the Court announced that a
search must include a physical intrusion. This case was overruled, however, by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which found that a search could be conducted by an electronic
listening device.
52. See United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 424
U.S. 918 (1976) (the court favorably compared the work of a drug dog to a magnetometer).
53. Fifty percent of the positive reactions by metal detectors at airports are for non-
violative reasons. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
54. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein,
521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 918 (1976) (the court found that the use
of a dog is similar to the use of binoculars and flashlights); Illinois v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308,
317, 367 N.E.2d 949, 953 (1977) ("the use of trained dogs ... poses no threat of harrassment,
intimidation, or even inconvenience").
For a more detailed discussion of the majority position, see Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FoRD L. REV. 973 (1976).
For a discussion of the decision of the federal district court's holding in United States v.
Solis, see Note, Have the Government's Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional
Nasal Congestion 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Supersnifers]. The
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled
directly on this issue, it did provide implicit acceptance of the use of
a drug detection dog in United States v. Chadwick." In that case a
dog's alert on a footlocker did not cause the exclusion of the contra-
band found inside the container even though no probable cause ex-
isted prior to the sniffing of the dog.56 Since the dog's sniffing was
not deemed to reach the level of a search, the Chadwick court could
find that the contraband later seized was admissible.
Chadwick appears consistent with earlier decisions in which the
Supreme Court found that no search occurred when police officers
smelled the odor of contraband.
5 7
The decisions by the federal courts in this area are unanimous
in finding no search.18 These cases, however, almost exclusively
dealt with the situations when the police used a dog only after a tip
created a suspicion of the existence of contraband. In only one case,
United States v. Race,59 did officials use the dog without any prior
knowledge. Although the court in Race found this immaterial6°
other federal courts, in dicta, have condemned the exploratory use of
the dog.6 ' The implication is that this unrestricted use constitutes a
search.
Three state courts, relying on the holdings of the federal courts,
have also held that the alert of a dog does not constitute a search.
62
In fact, the State of Washington recently concluded that the explora-
tory use of a dog at a bus station did not amount to a search for
purposes of the fourth amendment.63
lower court held that a warrantless detection of contraband by drug dogs is an unlawful
search. United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.
1976).
55. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
56. Id. at 3. The only evidence that police had prior to the dog's alert was that the
footlocker "looked suspicious" because of the presence of talcum powder. Id
57. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1947) (narcotics detected); Taylor v.
United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (liquor detected).
58. See notes 49, 51 and accompanying text supra.
59. 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976).
60. Id at 14 n.2.
61. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976) ("the investigation was not
indiscriminate, but solely directed to particular contraband"); United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976) (the court emphasized that the
dog was not used in a "dragnet operation").
62. State v. Quatsling, 24 Ariz. App. 105, 356 P.2d 226 (1975) (dog alerted on a rented
storage locker); Illinois v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 367 N.E.2d 949 (1977) (dog alerted on
luggage at an airport); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979) (dog alerted
on baggage in a bus terminal).
63. State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d 421, 424-25 (1979).
The court reasoned that because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the air surrounding his luggage, and because the dog did not trespass, the alert was justified
under the "plain smell" doctrine. For a criticism of this doctrine see note 74 and accompany-
ing text infra
B. The Use of a Dog Constitutes A Search
Vigorous dissents' frequently accompanied court opinions that
sided with the majority view and some courts have totally rejected
the accepted position. Ohio courts, for instance, consider the use of a
dog indistinguishable from a sophisticated electronic device.65 Simi-
larly, California courts have limited the use of dogs by holding that
the sniffing of a dog without some prior suspicion of illegal activity
constitutes a search.66 Even in the military, in which dogs are fre-
quently used to control drug traffic, the Court of Military Appeals is
hesitant to deny the existence of a search.67 The minority position is
that the effect of the dog's work is the same as if an actual physical
intrusion had occurred.6" For them, the Supreme Court's decision in
Katz v. United States6 9 relegated the issue of physical trespass to a
position of irrelevance. The basic premise of the minority, therefore,
is that the dog has not enhanced the smell of the handler, but has
replaced it.7"
C Summary
Certainly some merit exists in both the majority and minority
64. See, e.g., State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 822, 598 P.2d 421, 426 (1979) (McIn-
turff, J., dissenting) (dog had intruded into an area that the defendant was entitled to enjoy as
private). See also United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976) (a dog is a non-human means of detecting the
contents of a closed container).
65. State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 309,354 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1976) (the dog al-
lowed the police to perceive something entirely hidden from human senses).
66. People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436, 441 (1977). In Evans,
the police used a dog to sniff storerooms at a warehouse that were rented to the public. Id at
929, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 437. The court held that without prior knowledge, or at least a reason-
able suspicion, the activity constituted an unlawful search. Id. at 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
See also People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975) (indiscriminate use
of a drug dog in the search of airline baggage held illegal).
67. United States v. Thomas, I M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 1976). The defendant was convicted of
possession of marijuana based on evidence discovered in his wall locker by a drug dog. Be-
cause the search was initiated without specific knowledge of the location of the contraband,
Chief Judge Fletcher held that the action constituted an illegal, exploratory search. Id at 403-
04 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring). But see United States v. Grosskreutz, 5 M.J. 344, 346 (C.M.A.
1978) (use of a drug dog to examine a car that was believed to contain contraband did not
constitute a search); United States v. Bowles, 7 M.J. 725 (A.F.C.M.R. 1979) (use of a dog at a
random gate search was permissible).
For an early analysis of the use of drug dogs in the military, see Lederer and Lederer,
Admissibility of Evidence Found by Mari[uana Detection Dogs, THE ARMY LAWYER 12 (Apr.
1973). For an updated version see Note, Sniffer Dogs/or Drug Searches in the Military, 31
OKLA. L. REV. 709 (1978).
68. United States v. Thomas, I M.J. 397, 405 (C.M.A. 1976) (Ferguson, J., concurring);
State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 309, 254 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1976).
69. 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (no physical trespass occurred in the use of an electronic
listening device, but the action was, nevertheless, unconstitutional).
70. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
Several commentators agree with this conclusion. Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FoRD. L. REV. 973, 990 (1976); Note, Sniffer
Dogs/or Drug Searches in the Military, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 709, 711 (1978); Supersnifer, supra
note 54, at 426.
positions. Elaborate discussions of physical intrusions and theories
of sense-enhancing versus sense-replacing,7' however, contribute lit-
tle to a rational resolution of the issue.
The greatest degree of clarification comes from an analysis of
the operation's basic purpose. When the purpose of the dog's con-
duct is to locate drugs, the controllers of the operation have clearly
contemplated and intended discovery. Therefore, the most accurate
characterization of the incident is simply to describe it as a search.72
An argument to the effect that the action was a search of the
school and that the contraband detected in lockers can be lawfully
seized because of a "plain smell"' " doctrine, is constitutionally un-
sound. Assuming that a "plain smell" doctrine is permissible in cir-
cumstances in which the "plain view" doctrine applies, the
discovery's lack of inadvertance removes the theoretical basis that
underlies the "plain view" doctrine.74
V. The Application of the Fourth Amendment to Dog Searches
in Pennsylvania
A. Consequences of the Majority Position
If Pennsylvania courts decide that the dog's conduct does not
constitute a search for purposes of the fourth amendment, courts
continue to face the task of affirmatively describing the exact nature
of the conduct. Most judicial responses to this issue treat the activity
as the provision of a tip.75
1. The Legal Effect of an Alert. -Certainly an alert by a
trained drug detection dog does provide a tip in the sense that the
handler has acquired information that would lead him to believe
that contraband is present. The obvious problem that arises is
determining the degree of reliability assignable to this new
information.
In a recent decision,76 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
outlined four criteria to evaluate the reliability of a tip: (1) the
reliability of prior information supplied by the informant; (2)
71. See notes 54 and 70 and accompanying text supra.
72. A search is "[ain examination of a man's... premises. . . with a view to the discov-
ery of contraband." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (4th ed. 1951).
The common definition of a search is also supportive of this conclusion. A search is "the
act of seeking or looking diligently for some person or thing." FUNK & WAGNALL'S NEW
STANDARD DICTIONARY 2210 (15th ed. 1947).
73. State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d 421, 424-25 (1979).
74. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Mur-
ray, 460 Pa. 53, 331 A.2d 414 (1975).
75. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
76. Commonwealth v. Albert, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 399 A.2d 1106 (1979).
corroboration of the informant's information by other sources; (3)
whether the informant's statements were a declaration against
interest; and (4) whether the accused's reputation supports the
informant's information.77 Although the superior court was not
addressing the issue of a dog's reliability," there is no reason to
believe that a dog's alert would change the method of analysis.
Other courts addressing this issue have used similar approaches in
concluding that a dog's alert alone is sufficient to establish probable
cause.7 9 Because of the nature of the informant, the prior record of
the dog is the critical factor.
Pennsylvania is likely to follow this lead in light of several lower
court decisions, which have held that an individual's sense of smell
alone is sufficient to establish probable cause."0 These decisions are
also consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Taylor v. United States8 and Johnson v. United States82 in which the
Court described the identification of contraband by smell as,
"evidence of most persuasive character. ' 83
Some courts handling cases involving customs searches have
also analyzed the legal effect of a dog's alert. Because of the
77. Id at - 399 A.2d at 1109. The court emphasized that all four factors need not be
present in order to establish reliability. Id Similarly, the absence of all factors does not
necessarily preclude a finding "that a substantial basis exists for crediting the hearsay." In re
Burton, 259 Pa. Super. Ct. 20, 23, 393 A.2d 696, 697 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court expressed its basic position on the reliability of hearsay
initially in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (the magistrate must be informed of the
underlying circumstances and the basis for the officer's conclusion that the informant is
credible). To this decision the Court added its holding in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 415-16 (1969) (if the information is partially corroborated, the total effect must be as
dependable as a tip that has passed the two-step test without corroboration).
78. Id. at _ 390 A.2d at 1106-07 (a human informant provided the information which
led to the issuance of a warrant).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrera, 554 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1977) (a dog alert at a
border search constitutes probable cause); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(conduct of a dog, standing alone can provide probable cause); United States v. Bowles, 7 M.J.
735, 739-40 (A.F.C.M.R. 1979) (a dog alert at a random gate search establishes probable
cause); Illinois v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 315, 367 N.E.2d 949, 954 (1977) (the odor of
contraband is sufficient to establish probable cause); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813,
820, 598 P.2d 421, 425 (1979) (an alert of a dog in an exploratory search established probable
cause).
Although the United States Supreme Court has not determined the reliability of an alert,
Mr. Justice Blackmun indicated that an alert, along with other corroborating evidence, can
establish probable cause. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
The guidance provided by the Court in 1947 still correctly reflects the Court's attitude. "If
the presence of odors is testified to before a Magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to
know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, the Court
has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1947).
80. Commonwealth v. Acre, 25 Cumb. 62, 66 (Pa. C.P. 1974); Commonwealth v. Stoner,
28 Som. 72, 74-75 (Pa. C.P. 1973), aft'd, 344 A.2d 633 (1973); Commonwealth v. McMullins, 62
Luz. 109, 111 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
81. 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
82. 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
83. Id at 13. See note 79 supra.
importance of safeguarding national borders, the Supreme Court has
allowed customs officials to search international mail if they possess
a reasonable cause to suspect that the mail contains contraband .1
4
Courts have determined that the alert of a dog is sufficient to
establish the reasonable cause needed to conduct a search.85 Since
courts hearing these cases are using a standard that is lower than
probable cause, it is wrong to infer that a holding, which allows a
dog's alert to establish reasonable cause, necessarily precludes a
holding that it cannot also establish probable cause.
When the only information that exists prior to a search,
however, is the dog's alert, it is improvident to maintain that an alert
automatically establishes either probable cause or the lesser
reasonable cause. As previously noted,86 the most important
indicator of the reliability of an alert is the quality of the dog and his
handler. An accurate assessment of this quality must include
consideration of the initial selection and training of the dog, the
standard required for graduation and certification, and the past
efficiency of the dog in similar circumstances.87 Since the ultimate
determination of reliability is a function of these variables, a per se
rule which assigns a certain degree of reliability to all dog alerts is
unwise.
Keeping this changeable effect of an alert in mind, it becomes
necessary to identify the specific degree of assurity that the school
official must possess before he searches the student's locker.
2. The Standard Required for School Officials to Search.-
Most jurisdictions,88 including Pennsylvania,89 require only that the
school official possess a reasonable suspicion that a crime or
84. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612 (1977) (a bulky envelope mailed from
Thailand was sufficient to establish a reasonable cause to believe that the envelope contained
contraband). See also United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1978)
(officials can search any person or thing coming into the United States merely because that
person or thing was entering from abroad).
85. United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275, 1277 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 356, 358
(D. Hawaii, 1973).
For statistics on the effectiveness of drug dogs working for the Customs Service see
Supersniffers, supra note 54, at 416 n.31.
86. See note 54 and accompanying text supra
87. Supersnifers, supra note 54, at 416-17.
88. See, e.g., M. v. Board of Education of Bal-Chatham, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill.
1977); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 783, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282
A.2d 869, 872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 117, 296 A.2d 102, 107 (1972); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d 909, 913, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 736 (1971); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81,
558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977).
89. Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 380, 384, 323 A.2d 145, 147 (1974). In
addition to applying the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard, the court also held that
the school assistant principal was not a government agent. Judge Spaeth pointed out that once
the search was declared reasonable, the need to decide the government agent issue
disappeared. Id at 384, 323 A.2d at 147-48 (Spaeth, J., concurring). The converse is also true,
violation of school regulations is being committed before a search is
initiated. Interestingly, one frequently finds this result in
jurisdictions that recognize that school officials are agents of the
government.90 The private citizen/public official distinction9' is
thereby rendered irrelevant in those jurisdictions.92 The rationale
for this conclusion is similar to the reasoning that permits some
courts to hold that a teacher acts as a private citizen. Generally,
those courts adopting a lower standard that recognizes the public
necessity to maintain a disciplined and controlled school system.
93
Specifically, educators fear that the imposition of the higher
probable cause standard would unreasonably hinder the teachers'
ability to perform their disciplinary duties.94 The purpose, therefore,
of allowing a reasonable cause standard is to protect the student
from arbitrary searches while at the same time allowing the school
officials the opportunity to fulfill their obligations.95
The leniency and accepted policy reasons surrounding the
adoption of the reasonable cause standard have not made it
unwieldy to apply. It does, however, have its limits. For example, in
People v. Scott D.,96 when two students, whom school officials
suspected of using drugs, went to the restroom together twice within
the same hour, the court ruled that a subsequent search of them was
not based on a reasonable suspicion.97
Other interpretations of this standard reveal a more lenient
approach. Georgia courts have taken the position that a search is
reasonable if it is performed in the good faith exercise of the school
official's duty.98 This interpretation does not even require that the
since if an action is a totally private venture, the fourth amendment does not apply. See note
13 and accompanying text supra.
90. See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); People v. Ward,
62 Mich. App. 46, 50, 233 N.W.2d 180, 183 (1975); In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 115, 296
A.2d 102, 106 (1972); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 353, 540 P.2d 827, 832 (1975); People v.
Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 310, 311, 333 N.E.2d 369, 370, 372 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (1975).
91. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
92. See generaly Note, Public School Searches and Seizures, 45 FoRD. L. REv. 202, 212-
15 (1976).
93. Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d 909, 913, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 736 (1971) (court emphasized the serious effects of
juvenile crime and drug abuse); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784
(1977) (search must be designed to maintain school order and discipline).
94. A teacher would be negligent in the performance of his duties if he failed to
investigate a student believed to be in possession of contraband. In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super.
108, 117, 296 A.2d 102, 107 (1972).
95. State v. Baccino, 282 A 2d 869, 872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
96. 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974).
97. Id. at 489, 315 N.E.2d at 470, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 408. The court listed several factors
for consideration in determining if sufficient cause exists: (1) the child's age, history, and
school record; (2) the seriousness of the problem in the school; (3) the necessity to make the
search without delay; and (4) the probative value and reliability of the tip.
To the above list a Wisconsin court added the teacher's prior experience with the student.
In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 602, 280 N.W.2d 343, 351 (1979).
98. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 494, 216 S.E.2d 586, 591, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039
school official suspect a particular student of an offense prior to the
search. Clearly, this standard affords the student little tangible
protection.99
By contrast, Louisiana courts find that the rights of the student
significantly outweigh the interest of the school officials in
maintaining adherence to regulations."° Accordingly, a teacher in
that state must have probable cause before conducting a search of a
student or his possessions. 01
Neither of these extreme positions are likely to be persuasive
with Pennsylvania courts. As interpreted in the Commonwealth, 1
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the reasonable cause standard reflects a proper balance between the
conflicting interests of school officials and the privacy of students.
3. The Necessity for a Warrant. -The application of the
reasonable cause standard to school searches should not
automatically eliminate the necessity for a warrant. Courts that have
addressed this issue, however, hold to the contrary, 3 despite the
clear pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Camara
P. Municipal Court. 0  In Camara the Court allowed a lesser
standard than probable cause to justify an administrative search'05
but it nevertheless required issuance of a warrant prior to the
search. 106
Courts that do not require school officials to obtain a warrant
base their decisions on a rather broad declaration in favor of the
preservation of a proper academic environment."0 7 Although this
(1975). The court went on to say that even if the search was unreasonable, the evidence still
would have been admissible because the exclusionary rule applies only to law enforcement
officers. Id at 494-95, 216 S.E.2d at 591-92. Cf. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d
366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969) (school officials acting in conjunction with police are subject to
exclusionary rule).
99. For a critique of Young see Note, Student Searches-The Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule, 41 Mo. L. REV. 626 (1976).
100. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (1975), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1976).
101. Id at 320. Before concluding that probable cause was the appropriate standard, the
court held that a school official was an agent of the government because of his function and
accountability to the state. Id at 317. The dissent agreed with this position but found that the
reasonable suspicion standard would best meet the conflicting goals of control for the school
and privacy for the students. Id at 334 (Summers, J., dissenting).
102. Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, supra note 12.
103. See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
104. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The search in question in Camara was a general inspection of a
housing area conducted in accordance with provisions of the housing code. Id at 523-24.
105. The Court adopted the lower standard because administrative searches are not
personal and are not designed to turn up criminal evidence. Id at 538-39.
106. Id at 525-27.
Some commentators assert that the holding of Camara is applicable to school locker
searches only when the search is a general search to enforce the school regulations for health
and safety. Buss, supra note 17, at 754; Searches of Students, supra note 27, at 66.
107. See, e.g., Smythe v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 791 (W.D. Mich. 1975); In re G., 11
Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1198, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (1970); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 352, 540
P.2d 827, 832 (1975); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977).
concern is valid in certain situations,'08 it is inappropriate for school
officials to voluntarily introduce dogs and policemen into the school
setting and then assert that a search warrant would disrupt the
academic atmosphere.
The only conceivable legal justification that might support an
exception to the warrant requirement 0 9 would fall under the exigent
circumstances doctrine. Reliance on this doctrine, however, does not
redeem the practice of a warrantless search for three reasons: (1)
exigent circumstances do not justify a wholesale abandonment of the
fourth amendment;10 (2) ample time to obtain a warrant for the
search of a student's locker would exist; I" and (3) the evidence is in
no danger of being destroyed and the suspect is not likely to
disappear. 112
Recently, a Wisconsin court 1 3 stated in dicta that when
adequate time is available to obtain a warrant, the school official
must pursue this course." 4 The court did not find the circumstances
in that case to compel this decision' but it clearly resolved that all
school searches are not automatically exempt from constitutional
requirements. 1
6
School officials might also attempt to analogize the school
108. In trivial matters the warrant could unnecessarily interfere with the operation of the
school, but it need not always be a disruptive requirement. Police, for example, could appear
in street clothes or in an unmarked car. Buss, supra note 17, at 773 n.229.
109. There are six recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) a search incident
to an arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); (2) a search of a movable
vehicle, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); (3) a search under exigent
circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (4) a "stop and frisk" search, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); (5) a search that has been consented to, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); and (6) a search falling under the "plain view" doctrine,
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
110. Exigent circumstances must be evaluated with respect to a particular time, place, and
situation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Consequently, this exception has been
narrowly confined to the circumstances that bring it into play. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 458-62 (1971).
111. The possibility that a search would be delayed by obtaining a warrant does not
validate a warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 n.18 (1971).
112. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63-64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement is not a per se rule. Three conditions must be present before it is
applicable: (I) there must be probable cause; (2) there must be a reasonable possibility of the
agent's loss of dominion and control over the object of the search; and (3) there must not be
time to obtain a warrant. United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 901 (1974).
113. In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
114. Id at 601, 280 N.W.2d at 351.
115. In this case, the teacher had reason to believe the student was in possession of a knife.
Therefore, the court felt that there was no time to obtain a warrant. Id at 602, 280 N.W.2d at
356.
116. Similarly, should a court find that the school setting is an appropriate exception to
the warrant requirement, it does not necessarily follow that a search and seizure standard
lower than probable cause is also appropriate. Note, School Official's Authority to Search
Students is Augmented by the In Loco Parentis Doctrine, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 526, 533-34
(1977).
system to a highly regulated business in which the Supreme Court
has eliminated warrant requirements in certain situations." 7 The
small number of valid similarities between a public school system
and a regulated industry, however, negates the persuasive value of
that analogy.
4. Conclusion. -- Clearly, the search of a student's locker does
not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. " 8 Nor does any compelling legal or policy reason exist
for creating a new exception.
Therefore, assuming that an alert by a drug detection dog is not
a search, Pennsylvania courts should require the school official to
obtain a warrant prior to searching the student's locker. In
considering a warrant request, the magistrate must ultimately decide
whether an alert by the dog, without other corroborating evidence,
establishes a reasonable suspicion that contraband is present in the
student's locker. Without this assessment of the dog's reliability by a
neutral third party, the student's right to freedom from unreasonable
searches is effectively compromised."t 9
B. Consequences of the Minority Position
A minority of courts take the position that the use of a drug
detection dog constitutes a search.' 20 This finding may change the
focus of the inquiry but it does not alter the requirement of a war-
rant. Regardless of when the search occurred, the absence of cir-
cumstances which permit an exception to the warrant requirement'
2'
demands that the issuance of a warrant preface the conduct of the
search. The magistrate in these circumstances must, therefore, deter-
mine the quantity and quality of information possessed by the school
officials prior to the arrival of the dog. Once again, he must decide if
the information presented is sufficient to establish a reasonable cause
to believe that contraband is present in the student's locker.
22
The information, which the magistrate must evaluate, would in-
clude at a minimum the general knowledge of school officials that
drugs are present in the school. This will probably be based on a
117. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearm business); Collonade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor business).
118. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
119. This conclusion is consistent with the role of the search warrant as announced by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977). The Court identified three
reasons for adhering to the warrant requirement: (1) it provides for detached scrutiny which is
a more reliable safeguard than the officer's assertion; (2) it insures that the search will not
exceed reasonable bounds; and (3) it informs the object of the search of the officer's authority,
his need to search, and the limits of the search.
120. See note 70 and accompanying text supra
121. See note 109 and accompanying text supra
122. See note 88 and accompanying text supra
recognition of reality and general information supplied by students
and parents. 23  Courts evaluating this information could only de-
clare that the school officials had a reasonable suspicion to believe
that someone is in'possession of contraband in the school. The issue
is whether this suffices for the issuance of a general search warrant.
A federal court in New York has addressed this issue but in a
slightly different context. In Bellnier v. Lund, 24 a fifth grade teacher
discovered that a student was missing five dollars. Based upon the
claim of the victim, the teacher searched all members of the class. 
2
-
In evaluating the strength of the teacher's suspicion, or the legal ba-
sis for the search, the court found that the absence of particularized
facts with respect to which student was suspected was "something
which had time and time again. . . been found to be necessary to a
reasonable search under the fourth amendment."'' 26 Consequently,
the court concluded that general information could not support a
finding of reasonable suspicion.
127
Although the holding of Bellnier weighs strongly against the is-
suance of a warrant for a locker search when no specific information
is divulged, the court restricted its holding to the circumstances of
that case. The opinion clearly pointed out that if drugs were the
object of the search, instead of a small sum of money, the court
might reach a different conclusion. 12  The critical distinction drawn
between the two objects was based on the relative degrees of danger
posed by possession.
In Doe v. Renfrow 129 a similar emphasis on the dangers of drug
abuse among students brought about the result predicted in Bellnier.
Based solely upon general tips, letters, and phone calls,130 the court
felt compelled to find that, "in a public school setting, school officials
clothed with the responsibility of caring for the health and welfare of
the entire student population, may rely on such general information
to justify the use of canines to detect narcotics."
3 1
While this opinion properly gives deference to the role of the
123. School officials are frequently made aware of the extent of illegal drug usage by
students seeking to assist in the elimination of the contraband from school grounds. Interview
with Randall V. Drake, Assistant Principal, Carlisle Senior High School, in Carlisle, Pa. (Jan.
25, 1980); Telephone interview with Edward Nolan, Assistant Principal, Northern High
School, in Dillsburg, Pa. (Feb. 1, 1980).
124. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
125. Id at 50. The search included a search of coats in the cloakroom, the emptying of
students' pockets, the removal of shoes, and the actual undressing of the students in their
respective rest rooms. The money was never found.
126. Id at 54.
127. Id
128. Id
129. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
130. Id at 1015 n.2.
131. Id at 1021. The court went on to explain that the particular level of information
required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard should be determined on a case by case
educator, it results in a serious weakening of the student's rights if all
discretion is left to the school official. Without the imposition of the
warrant requirement, school officials are free to use dog searches
even in situations in which no definitive evidence exists.
By introducing the magistrate into the operation before the arri-
val of the dogs, the school official would have to substantiate his
suspicions with articulable facts. 3 2 If this information does not im-
plicate particular individuals, the magistrate should not automati-
cally refuse to issue the warrant. Rather, he should require the
presentation of other evidence 133 until he is able to form a substan-
tial basis for the conclusion that narcotics are probably present.'
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Applying this standard risks infringing on the rights of many
innocent students. This limited infringement is tolerable, however,
for several reasons. First, the actual degree of intrusion is mini-
mal. 1 31 Probably the majority of students will suffer no effect what-
soever. Second, the presence of drugs in schools is a serious threat to
the education, health and safety of all students. 36  Unfortunately,
the problem does not confine its deleterious effects merely to the
sources. Finally, a neutral third party would require positive infor-
mation prior to authorizing the search, 37 thus eliminating the possi-
bility of arbitrary action.
Further, the magistrate need not issue a warrant to search all
lockers if the information reflects only isolated use. For example, if
the evidence indicates only that a particular class, group, or team is
in possession of narcotics, the warrant should be appropriately lim-
ited. This practice is entirely consistent with the constitutional goal
of prohibiting unreasonable searches.' 31
basis. The court cautioned, however, that its interpretation of this standard applies only when
the purpose of the search is the health and safety of the students.
Future litigation will likely be directed at establishing guidance with respect to when a
search loses its health oriented purpose and becomes one whose purpose is actually discipli-
nary.
132. The Supreme Court has candidly admitted that one of the purposes of the warrant
requirement is simply to slow the government down before it invades the privacy of an indi-
vidual. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
133. Other convincing evidence might include reports of particularly dangerous drugs ap-
pearing throughout the school. Similarly, increases in the number of school thefts and student
fights might further support a school official's request for a warrant.
. 134. Commonwealth v. Gelfont, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ _ 399 A.2d 414, 417 (1979). The
evidence presented to the magistrate does not have to be strong enough to justify a conviction.
It must only form a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that a crime is being
committed.
135. See note 54 and accompanying text supra
136. Recent studies indicate that the regular use of marijuana at school plays havoc with
the learning process because the student's ability to reason is impaired. U.S. NEws AND
WORLD REPORT, Nov. 26, 1979, at 72. Similarly, heavy marijuana use can result in damage to
the lungs and the female reproductive system. Id See also note I and accompanying text
supra.
137. See note 122 and accompanying text supra
138. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (the Constitution does not forbid all
searches, only unreasonable ones).
In summary, a holding that the sniffing of a drug dog is a
search, requires the issuance of a search warrant prior to the opera-
tion. Depending on the particular circumstances the magistrate
could issue a warrant in the absence of particular facts implicating
specific individuals. This practice would equitably balance the con-
flicting interests of the school officials and the privacy rights of the
students.' 39 The students, therefore, are free from harassing inter-
ruptions, limitless searches, and capricious impositions, while the
school officials are permitted to enforce the standards prescribed by
law.
VI. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the level of drug abuse among American high
school students is a matter of substantial public concern. Because
the problem affects students and their families on a highly personal
level, opinions about the cause and proposed solutions are voiced
with considerable emotion. When these proposals are evaluated for
compliance with constitutional principles, however, the analysis
must filter out the emotional responses.
Therefore, an objective analysis of the use of drug detection
dogs in public high schools reveals that the fourth amendment is
clearly applicable. The existence of a governmental action and the
search of a constitutionally protected area demand this conclusion.
With attachment of the fourth amendment comes the requirement
that the issuance of a warrant precede the conduct of the search.
This constitutionally mandated requirement stands regardless of
whether a court characterizes the conduct of a drug dog as a search.
Without the imposition of the warrant, the constitutional rights of
students are subject to a serious and uncontrollable restriction.
CHARLES C. THEBAUD, JR.
139. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
